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NOTES
TAKINGS CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF UTILITY RATEMAKING
DECISIONS: MEASURING HOPE'S INVESTOR
INTEREST FACTOR
INTRODUCTION

In its landmark 1944 decision, FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,I the Supreme Court established a deferential,2 end result
standard3 for reviewing the constitutionality 4 of government regulation
of public utility rates.5 The Hope test requires courts to examine the
balance struck by the ratemaking authority between the competing inter1. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
2. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1179 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en bane) (Hope limited, but did not eliminate, judicial review of ratemaking decisions); Hoecker, "Used and Useful" Autopsy of a RatemakingPolicy, 8 Energy L. J. 303,
309 (1987).
3. See Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. According to Hope, "[i]f the total effect of the rate
order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry... is at an end." Id.;
see infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
4. If utility rates do not "afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use
of utility property without paying just compensation and so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 616 (1989). The
takings clause of the fifth amendment provides: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 5. The decision in
Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897), is generally credited
with incorporating the takings clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Drobak,
From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The ConstitutionalLimits On Utility Rate Regulation,
65 B.U.L. Rev. 65, 72 n.27 (1985).
5. The term "public utility" is not amenable to precise definition. See C. Phillips,
Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities 4 (1985). One judge has described the elements of
a public utility enterprise as follows:
If a business is (1) affected with a public interest, and (2) bears an intimate
connection withi the processes of transportation and distribution, and (3) is
under an obligation to afford its facilities to the public generally, upon demand,
at fair and nondiscriminatory rates, and (4) enjoys, in a large measure an independence and freedom from business competition brought about either (a) by its
acquirement of a monopolistic status, or (b) by the grant of a franchise or certificate from the State placing it in this position, it is ...a public utility ....
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 321 U.S. 144 (1944). This definition is subject to
exceptions. See, e.g., C. Phillips, Jr., supra, at 105 (a public utility need not be monopolistic). Essentially, public utility enterprises in the United States share two traits: private
ownership and public regulation. See id. at 5. Commenting on the public interest with
which utilities are affected, Justice Frankfurter observed that "the needs that are met by
public utilities are as truly public services as the traditional governmental functions of
police and justice." Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is "[t]his partly public, partly private status of utility property [that] creates its own set of questions under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S.Ct. 609, 615 (1989); see
also Drobak, supra note 4, at 85 (the Hope Court "retained a specialized doctrine for [the
constitutional review ofl ratemaking").
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ests of utility investors and consumers.'
In applying Hope to specific ratemaking decisions, courts have disagreed on whether the investor interest should be judged relative to prudently incurred investment 7 in the enterprise or relative to property that
currently provides electric power to consumers.8 Ratemaking disputes
involving nuclear power plants indicate how crucial this distinction can
be.9 Electric utilities have invested billions of dollars to develop nuclear
generating stations,"0 many of which have been abandoned or have yet to
provide electricity."1 The cost of the plants that have come on line has
6. See Hope, 320 U.S. at 603; infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. Prudent investment ratemaking provides a return upon the amount prudently invested in the utility by its stockholders-"that is, the original cost minus any fraudulent,
unwise, or extravagant expenditures that should not be a burden on the public." C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 292; see Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 & n.1 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring). "Prudent investment" is a term of art taken from the prudent investment method of ratemaking. This
method was first advocated by Justice Brandeis in a famous concurring opinion, joined by
Justice Holmes. See id. at 289. The "fair return upon fair value," or used and useful
ratemaking methodology, was the constitutionally mandated standard at the time of the
Southwestern Bell decision. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. Brandeis's
prudent investment methodology constituted a departure from the fair return upon fair
value standard in two respects. First, it provided for a return upon capital prudently
invested by the utility, not upon utility property that was used and useful in providing
service. Second, the prudent investment standard provided for a return based on historical cost, as opposed to the Smyth "present fair value" standard. See infra notes 47-55
and accompanying text. The rationale behind the prudent investment standard is that
"[t]he thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property... but
capital embarked in the enterprise." Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 290 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
8. The proposition that a utility enterprise should only earn "a fair return upon the
value of that which it employs for the public convenience," Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 547 (1898), stems from an analogy to eminent domain. See Drobak, supra note 4, at
78. The utility has a legal obligation to provide service. See C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5,
at 106; Sommers, Recovery of Electric Utility Losses From Abandoned Construction
Projects, 8 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 363, 374 (1982); see, e.g., N.H. Stat. Ann. § 374:1
(1984); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1501 (Purden 1979). Courts perceived this service
obligation to be a public use of the utility's property requiring just compensation. See
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154
U.S. 362, 410 (1894); Drobak, supra note 4, at 79. The public, however, should not be
required to pay for something that does not provide service. See Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); Tennessee Gas
Pipeline v. F.E.R.C., 606 F.2d 1094, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920
(1980); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951); Hoecker, supra note 2, at 333. Therefore, the utility is only
entitled to earn a return on property that is currently providing service to its customers.
This principle is embodied in the used and useful ratemaking methodology. See Hoecker,
supra note 2, at 306-07.
9. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, Regulatory Issues in Nuclear Plant Cancellations,
122 Pub. Util. Fort., Sep. 1, 1988, at 16-17; Hoecker, supra note 2, at 314 n.53, 335;
Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment ofMistakes in Retrospect: CancelledPlants and Excess
Capacity, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 498-99, 511-13 (1984); Note, Statutes ProhibitingCost
Recovery for CancelledNuclear Power Plants: Constitutional? Pro-Consumer?,28 Wash.
U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 345, 363 (1985).
10. See Drobak, supra note 4, at 112 n.223; Pierce, supra note 9, at 497-98.
11. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 497; Note, Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities
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far exceeded original estimates.1 2 Given the magnitude of these investments, whether a court considers them for the purpose of an inquiry into
the reasonableness of utility rates is crucial. 3
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,14 a recent instance of rare Supreme
Court ratemaking review,15 sustained the Hope standard's validity but
raised questions concerning its implementation. Justice Scalia, in a conCommission: Who Shall Bear the Cost of Abandonment?, 11 Cap. U.L. Rev. 91, 91
(1981).
12. See Glicksman, Allocating the Cost of ConstructingExcess Capacity: "Who Will
Have To Pay For It All?", 33 U. Kan. L. Rev. 429, 429 (1985); Pierce, supra note 9, at
505.
13. The experience of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire ("PSNH")
illustrates the potential disparity between the value of prudently-incurred investment and
used and useful property. PSNH has invested about $2 billion for its 35.6% interest in
the Seabrook nuclear generating station. See Ingrassia, PS ofNew HampshireBankruptcy
Plea Marks End of Nuclear Big-Building Phase, Industry Survives, Wall St. J., Feb. 1,
1988, at 56, col. 1. Between 93 and 100 percent of PSNH's Seabrook investment was
prudently-incurred. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant, Appendix C at 38a, Public Serv. Co. v. New Hampshire, 109 S. Ct. 858 (1989) (DR 87-151, Interlocutory Transfer Without Ruling (N.H.P.U.C. Aug. 11, 1987)) [hereinafter "Jurisdictional
Statement"], dismissingappealsub. nom., Petition of Public Serv. Co., 130 N.H. 265, 539
A.2d 263 (1988). Seabrook is complete but not yet producing electricity commercially.
See Seabrook Goes to Work- $6 Billion, Decade Later, Wall St. J., Jun. 14, 1989, at C14,
col. 6. New Hampshire law bars recovery of Seabrook's construction costs until it produces electricity for consumers. See Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co., 125 N.H. 46, 54-55, 480
A.2d 20, 25 (1984) (construing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378:30-a (1984)). Thus, PSNH's
prudently-incurred investment of at least $1.6 billion, see JurisdictionalStatement, supra,
at 38a, is four times its rate base (representing property that is, by definition, used and
useful). See id. at 29a (DR 87-151, Report Regarding Request for Transfer (N.H.P.U.C.
Aug. 11, 1987)). Shortly after the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected PSNH's bid
for an emergency rate increase, the company sought protection of the federal bankruptcy
laws. See Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 37, col. 3. See generally Darr, Federal-State
Comity in Utility Bankruptcies, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 63, 63-64 (1989) (utilities now view
bankruptcy as a possibility because of plant abandonments and concomitant adverse rate
decisions). PSNH recently was granted a full-power license by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1990, at A18, col. 6. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit refused to block issuance of the permit, so Seabrook should
begin producing electricity commercially by the summer of 1990, seventeen years since it
was first planned. See Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
14. 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989). Duquesne is unremarkable in that it simply reaffirms Hope.
See Radford, The Supreme Court Took the Wrong Case, 123 Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 16,
1989, at 4 (calling the decision "less-than-novel"); High CourtAllows States to Deny Rate
Recovery of Cost of Canceled Plant, 123 Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 16, 1989, at 55 (calling
holding in Duquesne "particularly narrow").
15. See Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 91, 99100, 447 N.E.2d 733, 740 (1983); Drobak, supra note 4, at 67-68 & n.10 ("the Supreme
Court has repeatedly refused to review the constitutionality of state ratemaking decisions
during the past forty years"); Smartt, Hearingin the Supreme Court Is an HistoricEvent,
122 Pub. Util. Fort., Oct. 27, 1988, at 4.
Some courts have construed the Supreme Court's refusal to hear appeals from allegedly
confiscatory ratemaking decisions as an implicit recognition that "'[t]he Constitution no
longer provides any special protection for the utility investor.'" Dayton Power & Light, 4
Ohio St. 3d at 99-100, 447 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation:
The Little Locomotive that Couldn't, 1970 Wash. U.L.Q. 223, 259-260). The Court's
recent decision in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, however, contradicts this assertion.
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curring opinion, questioned what benchmark a reviewing court should
employ in analyzing the investor interest factor of the Hope balancing
standard. 6 He remarked that "[w]e cannot determine whether the payments a utility has been allowed to collect constitute a fair return on
investment, and thus whether the government's action is confiscatory,
unless we agree upon what the relevant 'investment' is. For that purpose, all prudently incurred investment may well have to be counted."' 7
One court articulated the issue as "whether the end result test is to be
applied to a utility overall or only to those assets which valid Commission rules permit to be included in the rate base."' 8
This Note examines whether all prudently incurred investment must
be considered in a judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of utility
ratemaking decisions.' 9 Part I examines the Supreme Court's treatment
of utility rate regulation prior to Hope. Part II analyzes the Hope deciSee 109 S. Ct. 609, 615 (1989) (special status of utilities merits unique constitutional
analysis).
At least one other court has discerned support for its holding in the Supreme Court's
dismissing appeals of allegedly confiscatory ratemaking decisions. See Pennsylvania Elec.
Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 509 Pa. 324, 334-35, 502 A.2d 130, 136 (1985),
appeal dismissedsub. nom., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
476 U.S. 1137 (1986). In Pennsylvania Electric, the utility commission had excluded the
damaged Three Mile Island plant from the rate bases of Metropolitan Edison and Pennsylvania Electric. The utilities claimed that these new rates were confiscatory. See id. at
327, 502 A.2d at 131-132. In rejecting the utilities' contentions, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has.., through
dismissal of the Jersey Centralappeal, stated implicitly its approval of the holding in that
case, and our holding in the instant case is identical to that which was approved in Jersey
Central." Id. at 335, 502 A.2d at 136 (citing In re Jersey CentralPower & Light Co., No.

A-162-81T2 (N.J. Super. Ct., July 28, 1983), cert. denied, 95 N.J. 217, 470 A.2d 433
(1983), appeal dismissed sub. nom., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Board of Pub.
Utils., 466 U.S. 947 (1984)). In Jersey Central,the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal
from an adverse ratemaking decision in a case arising out of the same nuclear plant shutdown at issue in Pennsylvania Electric.

However, the court's contention in Pennsylvania Electric that the dismissal of Jersey
Centralsupported its holding is misplaced. While it is true that "a dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question is ...

a decision on the merits," Pennsylvania Electric, 509

Pa. at 335, 502 A.2d at 136, its "precedential effect ... extends no further than 'the
precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.'" Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5 (1983); see R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme
Court Practice 250-51 (6th ed. 1986). Takings analyses are "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see also Covington &
Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (analysis of ratemaking decisions depends upon special facts of case). Therefore, the precedential effect of the
Jersey Central case is necessarily quite narrow and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
reliance on that case for support is erroneous. See generally R. Stern, E. Gressman & S.
Shapiro, supra, at 247-52 (discussing precedential effect of Court's summary affirmances).
16. See Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
17. Id.

18. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 730 F.2d 816, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 768 F.2d 1500 (1985), vacated and remanded, 810 F.2d 1168

(1987) (en banc). See ina notes 71-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hope
and the end result test promulgated therein.
19. This Note will primarily address issues affecting the electric utility industry.
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sion and the end result standard it enunciated. Part III discusses state
and federal court application of the Hope standard.2" This Note concludes that a reviewing court must consider all prudently incurred investment when weighing the investor interest under Hope.
I.

BACKGROUND:

FROM MUNN TO HOPE

In Munn v. Illinois,2" the Supreme Court determined that government
regulation of prices was constitutional.2 2 While Munn settled one constitutional controversy, it sparked another over the limits of government
regulation.2 3
The first significant ratemaking decision after Munn came in the Railroad Commission Cases,24 where the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Mississippi statute that created a commission to regulate railroads
operating in the state.2" The Court reaffirmed Munn 26 and began to de28
fine the limits on government ratemaking.2 7 In an oft-quoted comment,
the Court declared that:
[t]his power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not
the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and
freights, the State cannot.., do that which in law amounts to a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation, or with20. Most authority in this area comes from state courts because the Johnson Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), generally prevents federal court interference in state rate proceedings. See Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 1974); Darr,
supra note 13, at 68-69. States regulate utilities at the retail level, while the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regulates utilities at the wholesale level. See
Regulations Preambles, II F.E.R.C. 1 30,455 at 30,496 (1983), aff'd in part, vacated on
other grounds, Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Comment, Cancelled Utility Plant and Traditional Ratemaking Theories: Are Either
Used and Useful?, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 669, 673 (1985). Federal courts have considered
the issue, however; the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review FERC rate decisions. See 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1982). See generally Phillips, supra note 5, at 115-31
(discussingstate and federal utility regulators).
21. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
22. See id. at 130 ("when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to
public regulation"). For a discussion of the origins of government price regulation, see
id. at 124-30; C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 75-79.
23. Munn failed to make clear that the judiciary could review government regulation
of prices. The Munn court declared that "it has been customary from time immemorial
for the legislature to declare what shall be reasonable compensation .... For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
Munn, 94 U.S. at 133-34. Over the next twenty years, however, the Court established the
propriety of judicial review of ratemaking decisions. See Drobak, supra note 4, at 71-75;
infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
24. 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
25. See id. at 336.
26. See id. at 335.
27. See id. at 331.
28. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 523 (1898); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford,
164 U.S. 578, 593 (1896).
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out due process of law.29

The limitations on government regulation expressed in the Railroad
Commission Cases became firmly established as the Court reaffirmed the
decision over the next several years.3" The Court also began to endorse
judicial review of ratemaking decisions.3 1
32
That endorsement came in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
Justice Brewer's opinion for the Reagan Court drew an analogy between
rate regulation and the law of eminent domain.33 Brewer concluded that
utility property subject to state regulation (taken for public use) must be
compensated according to its actual value.34 The Reagan Court also reiterated the limits on government ratemaking first articulated in the Railroad Commission Cases." Reagan held that a rate reduction which set
rates insufficient to pay interest on debt or dividends on stock was unjust
and unreasonable.3 6
The first case to hold expressly that rates must be high enough to generate dividends in the absence of proof that the public interest justified
lower rates was Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford.37 The
Sandford Court discussed the public and private interests in utility rate
determinations and refined the limits on government rate regulation.3 8
Sandforddeclared that a turnpike company was entitled to tolls that enabled it to keep its road in proper repair and pay dividends on its stock.3 9
The public, however, had an interest in paying only reasonable tolls."
29. 116 U.S. at 331.
30. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukes & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 455
(1890); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 179 (1888).
31. See Chicago Railway, 134 U.S. at 455; Drobak, supra note 4, at 71-75; supra note

23.
32. See 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) ("[I]t is within the scope ofjudicial power and a part
of judicial duty to restrain anything which, in the form of a regulation of rates, operates
to deny to the owners of property invested in the business of transportation that equal
protection which is the constitutional right of all owners of other property."); Drobak,
supra note 4, at 73.
33. See Barron, The Evolution of Smyth v. Ames: A Study of the JudicialProcess, 28
Va. L. Rev. 761, 777-78 (1942).
34. See id. at 791-92; Drobak, supra note 4, at 75. Judge Brewer's reasoning in Ames
v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 64 F. 165 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894), aff'd sub. nom. Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), seems to have been adopted in Smyth. See Barron,supra note
33, at 790-91; Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1116,
1120 (1942). But cf Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive that
Couldn't, 1970 Wash. U.L.Q. 223, 239 n.94 (no express adoption of eminent domain
analogy).
35. See Reagan, 154 U.S. at 399.
36. See id. at 412-13.
37. 164 U.S. 578 (1896); see Drobak, supra note 4, at 76.
38. See Sandford, 164 U.S. at 596-97. The Sandford Court also adopted Justice
Brewer's eminent domain analogy from Reagan. See id. at 593-94 (discussing Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894)).
39. See Sandford, 164 U.S. at 596.
40. See id. at 596-97.
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433

In the first landmark utility ratemaking case, 4 ' Smyth v. Ames,42 the
Court found that rates fixed under a Nebraska statute were unreasonably
low and therefore violative of the fourteenth amendment.4 3 The Smyth
Court noted the special situation of a public utility: "A railroad is a
public highway, and none the less so because constructed and maintained
through the agency of a corporation deriving its existence and powers
In weighing the public and private interests,4" the
from the State."'
Court stated that investors must receive compensation for the use of their
property, though observing that "[h]ow such compensation may be ascertained, and what are the necessary 46elements in such an inquiry, will
always be an embarrassing question.",
The Smyth Court concluded that "[w]hat the company is entitled to
ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public
convenience." '47 Thus, the utility is permitted to earn a return only on
that property currently providing service to customers. Smyth's fair-return-upon-fair-value standard48 is generally viewed as an adoption of the
used and useful ratemaking methodology.49 After Smyth, it was the only
constitutionally permissible ratemaking methodology.
The fair-return-on-fair-value test may have been appealing in theory,
but it was problematic in practice.5 ° The test required a court to determine the "fair value" of a utility enterprise, a task that became increasingly complex and imprecise. 5
In Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
41. See Hanson & Davies, Judicial Review of Rate of Return Calculations, 8 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. 499, 531 (1982); Hoecker, supra note 2, at 305; cf Drobak, supra note 4,
at 76 (Smyth dominated utility law for nearly fifty years).
42. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
43. See id. at 528, 550.
44. Id. at 544; see supra note 5 and accompanying text; infra note 127 and accompanying text.
45. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 544-46.
46. Id. at 546.
47. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
48. See Drobak, supra note 4, at 77-78; Hoecker, supra note 2, at 305 & n.12. For a
discussion of the used and useful standard of ratemaking, see supra note 8.
49. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc); Hoecker, supra note 2, at 305-06.
50. If one accepts Justice Brewer's application of the eminent domain analogy, see
supra note 33 and accompanying text, then indeed fair value should be accorded to investors. However, the eminent domain analogy proved inappropriate. See Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952
(1951); Drobak, supra note 4, at 83; Harbeson, The Demise of Fair Value, 42 Mich. L.
Rev. 1049, 1054 (1944). While rates must be reasonable, regulation does not per se effect
a taking of property requiring just compensation. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968) (government may "limit stringently" investor returns); Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944); Washington Gas
Light, 188 F.2d at 18-19.
51. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 616 & n.5 (1989); Missouri ex
rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 296-301, 301 n.13 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Hale, The Fair Value Merry-Go-Round, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 517,
517 (1939); Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 1031, 1051
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Commission, 2 Justice Brandeis noted that the Smyth rule was "legally
and economically unsound."53 He proposed replacing it with a standard
that focused not on the utility's property but on the "amount prudently

invested in [the utility]" by its stockholders.

4

Brandeis reasoned that

the "thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property ... but capital embarked in the enterprise." 55 If the prudent investment methodology had been adopted by the Court, as Brandeis
advocated, it would have replaced fair-return-on-fair-value as the constitutionally mandated ratemaking methodology. It failed to become the
constitutional standard, as the Hope Court eschewed the elevation of any
ratemaking methodology to constitutional status.5 6 The prudent investment standard would, in part, prevail in the long run, however, as Hope
and its progeny analyzed investor interests in terms of prudently incurred
investment. 7
The Southwestern Bell decision, coupled with widespread criticism by
commentators and utility commissions, led to an erosion of the Smyth
standard and foreordained its eventual demise.58 Indeed, many influential jurists either criticized or limited the Smyth standard. 9 Despite the
criticism, it remained the constitutionally-mandated standard of review
until the decision in FederalPower Commission v. NaturalGas Pipeline.'
In that case, the Court retreated from the Smyth fair value standard,
declaring that "[t]he Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to
the service of any single formula."'" Natural Gas Pipeline "start[ed] a
(1920); Hoecker, supra note 2, at 307; Kauper, Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate
Base, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 1209, 1212 (1939).
52. 262 U.S. 276 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 290.
54. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted); See supra note 7.
55. Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 290.
56. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
58. See Missouri ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 301-02 & nn. 13-14 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring); C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at
162, 294-95; Hoecker, supra note 2, at 308 n.25; Kauper, supra note 51, at 1209 ("The
current frontal attack on the 'fair value' theory constitutes one of the most vigorous and
uncompromising assaults ever made upon any single specific rule enunciated and developed by the Court in its interpretation of the due process clause."(footnote omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (calling Smyth formula "mischievous"); West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 680-81 (1935) (Stone, J., with Brandeis & Cardozo, JJ.,
dissenting) (end result of order must be confiscatory for there to be constitutional implications); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 69-71 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (inquiry is whether rate order in its totality is confiscatory).
60. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
61. Id. at 586. Natural Gas Pipeline construed the requirement of the Natural Gas
Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1988), that rates be "just and reasonable." See Hope, 320
U.S. at 602. The Court remarked that "[b]y longstanding usage in the field of rate regulation, the 'lowest reasonable rate' is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional
sense.... It follows that the Congressional standard prescribed by this statute coincides
with that of the Constitution .. " NaturalGas Pipeline, 315 U.S. at 585-86; see Permian
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new chapter in the regulation of utility rates."6 2 No longer would the
Court engage in the detailed, microeconomic analysis of the utility enterprise that the Smyth standard entailed. Rather, "[i]f the Commission's
order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its entirety, produces
no arbitrary result, [the] inquiry is at an end." 63 Thus, the Court was
moving away from a standard which focused on ratemaking methodology to one which would instead focus on the results of ratemaking
decisions.

II.

TAKINGS CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF UTILITY RATES

A. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 4 was decided in
1944, two years after the Natural Gas Pipeline decision. In Hope, the
Court underscored its abandonment of the Smyth standard and enunciated a new constitutional standard for evaluating utility rates.6 5 Hope
reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit66 that
had invalidated a Federal Power Commission ("FPC") order fixing rates
under the Natural Gas Act.67 The Fourth Circuit had set aside the
FPC's order on the traditional grounds that the rate base6" should reflect
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 607 (1944).
62. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. at 601-02 (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.,
concurring).
63. Id. at 586.
64. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
65. See id. at 601-03.
66. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 134 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1943), reversed, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988).
68. Utility rates are typically calculated according to the revenue requirement standard, see C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 157, which is represented by the following
formula:
R = 0 + (V - D)r
"R" is the total revenue required; "0" is operating costs (e.g., wages, fuel, maintenance,
depreciation, amortization); "(V - D)" is the rate base, with "V" being gross cost of
tangible and intangible property and "D" being the accrued depreciation on such property; and "r" is the allowed rate of return on rate base. See id. at 157-58; Drobak, supra
note 4, at 94 n.139; Pierce, supra note 9, at 511-12; Note, supra note 9, at 348-51. A
utility's revenue ("R") is calculated by adding its operating costs ("0") and its return on
rate base ("(V-D)r"). See C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 157-58. Typically, the rate base
represents the utility's assets that are used and useful in providing service to its customers. See Hoecker, supra note 2, at 303; Note, supra note 9, at 349 n.32. Each state has its
own standards for determining what property is used and useful. See Note, supra note 9,
at 349 & n. 12. Compare Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 67 Ohio
St. 2d 153, 164, 423 N.E.2d 820, 827 (1981) (construing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4909.15
(Anderson 1977) as prohibiting recovery of cost of cancelled nuclear plant because it is
not used and useful), appeal dismissed sub. nom., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
Office of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982) with People's Org. for Wash. Energy
Res. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 104 Wash. 2d 798, 822, 711 P.2d 319, 333 (1985)
(construing Wash. Rev. Code § 80.04.250 (1962) as permitting recovery of cancelled
plant costs).
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"present fair value" and that "actual legitimate cost" (historical cost)
was not the proper measure of "fair value."' 69 The Smyth standard had
required a return upon fair value, not upon historical cost of utility
property.7"
Noting the circularity of the fair return on fair value standard, 7 ' the
Supreme Court declared that "'fair value' is the end product of the process of rate-making not the starting point .... [R]ates cannot be made to
depend upon 'fair value' when the value of the going enterprise depends
on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated."7 2 Discussing
Natural Gas Pipeline, the Court articulated the constitutional inquiry as
follows: "If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust
and unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an end."7 3 The Court thus
retreated from an analysis of ratemaking methodologies employed by
ratemaking authorities. Instead, the Court shifted the emphasis of the
constitutional inquiry to the effects of rates regardless of the methodology under which they had been set.
According to Hope, a court must consider the competing interests of
investors and consumers when determining whether the result of a
ratemaking decision is unreasonable.7 4 The Court asserted that the utility investor75 "has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the
company. ' 7 6 The investor's return "should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital."7 7 The "end result" test that emerged from
Hope remains the constitutional standard for utility ratemaking.78
B. Application of the Hope Standard
Hope mandates end results that are "just and reasonable," 79 but those
69. See Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 599-600

(1944).

70. See supra note 8.
71. See Hope, 320 U.S. at 601; Hale, supra note 51, at 517.
72. Hope, 320 U.S. at 601 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 602.
74. See id. at 603.
75. Hope articulated the investor interest in a ratemaking decision but did not expound upon the consumer interest. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Drobak, supra note 4, at 86-87. The Hope Court need not
have considered "the public interest in reaching its decision because Hope would still
earn enough under the new reduced rates to satisfy the investor part of the constitutional
test." Drobak, supra note 4, at 87. Nonetheless, the consumer interest is an important
component in the Hope balancing approach. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc.,
417 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1974); Drobak, supra note 4, at 88-93.

76. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
77. Id. at 603 (citing Missouri ex. rel. S.W. Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
78. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 617 (1989); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 388 (1974); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 770 (1968).
79. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
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terms are difficult to define with precision."0 Moreover, Hope and its
progeny provided few criteria by which a reviewing court can judge the
end result of a rate order.8 1 The Court itself has applied Hope infrequently. 2 Without guidance, courts have differed over how to weigh the
investor interest factor in the balancing of interests that Hope
mandated. s3
A typical example of the resulting confusion, and the stakes commonly
involved, arose in a line of cases involving the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") and Jersey Central Power & Light Company
("JCP&L"). 8 4 JCP&L requested amortization over fifteen years of its
$397 million investment in the abandoned Forked River nuclear generating station. 5 The company also requested rate base inclusion for the
unamortized balance of its investment with a rate of return sufficient to
80. See C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 163.
81. See C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 338-39; Hanson & Davies, supra note 41, at
531; Pierce, Public UtilityRegulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police the
PoliticalInstitutions?,77 Geo. L.J. 2031, 2032 (1989).
82. See Drobak, supra note 4, at 67-68 & n.10; Hanson & Davies, supra note 41, at
531.
83. Compare Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 91,
101 n.1 1, 447 N.E.2d 733, 741 n.11 (1983) ("[t]he property for which constitutional protection is invoked is that 'used and useful in the public service' ") (quoting West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 78 (1935) (Stone, J., concurring)) with
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (end-result test does not apply just to assets that are used and useful).
84. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 730 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 768 F.2d 1500 (1985), vacated and remanded, 810 F.2d 1168
(1987) (en banc).
85. See 810 F.2d 1168, 1171. There are three ways to treat sunk costs in cancelled
generating plants. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16; Pierce, supra note
9, at 542; Comment, Cancelled Utility Plant and TraditionalRatemaking Theories: Are
Either Used and Useful?, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 669, 682 (1985). First, a utility commission could deny any recovery of sunk costs. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note
9, at 16; Comment, supra, at 692. Obviously, this is the worst scenario for the utility. See
Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16; Pierce, supra note 9, at 542. The other
two ways to treat sunk costs involve amortization, which is the "gradual extinguishment
of a loss or debt." Comment, supra, at 681 n.90. Both amortization treatments expense
(amortize) the investment in cancelled plant over a specified period of years. See Hearth,
Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16; Comment, supra, at 681 n.90. This yearly amortization charge is included as an operating expense that is reimbursed in the utility's total
revenue allowance. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16.
The difference between the amortization methods is in their treatment of the unamortized balance of the loss. The unamortized balance of the loss may or may not be included in the rate base upon which the utility earns a return. A utility would recover all
of its sunk costs through amortization without rate base treatment of the unamortized
balance. However, the present value of the recovery would be less than the sunk costs
because of the time value of money. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16;
Comment, supra, at 681 n.90. From the utility's perspective, the most advantageous
treatment of the costs involves amortization with rate base treatment for the unamortized
balance of sunk costs. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16; Comment,
supra, at 682-83. In this case, the utility would earn a return on their unamortized costs
until the entire loss had been amortized. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at
16.
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cover the carrying charges of its debt and preferred stock.86 FERC allowed the amortization, but denied rate base treatment of the investment." In the ensuing litigation, FERC first contended that "it is wellsettled that the end result test only has application to items which are
legitimately included in the rate base as 'used and useful.' "88 FERC
subsequently reversed itself, conceding in its second response that "the
end result test does not only apply to those assets which valid Commission rules permit to be included in the rate base.... [but] to the overall
situation produced by the Commission's action .... "I'
Some courts have held that the investor interest should be measured
by utility property that is used and useful in providing electricity.90
Other courts have held that the investor interest is properly measured by
the amount prudently invested in the utility enterprise by its
shareholders. 9
The distinction between the two measures of the investor interest is
crucial, particularly in the context of incomplete or abandoned nuclear
generating stations.9" In fact, the issue has arisen most frequently in de86. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc).
87. See id. at 1172.
88. Id. at 1174 (quoting Response of FERC to Petition for Rehearing at 2).
89. Id. (citing Brief for FERC in Response to the Court's Order of July 16, 1984, at
4).
90. See, e.g., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 239 Kan. 483, 490,
720 P.2d 1063, 1071 (1986), prob.jurisdiction noted, 479 U.S. 1082, appeal withdrawn,
481 U.S. 1044 (1987); Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 509
Pa. 324, 334, 502 A.2d 130, 135 (1985) ("the Hope decision is to be interpreted as recognizing a constitutional requirement of 'just and reasonable' utility rates, providing a return on used and useful property"), appealdismissed sub. nom., Metropolitan Edison Co.
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986).
91. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1181 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en bane); cf Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 18-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (used and useful no longer part of the constitutional standard), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 952 (1951); Attorney General v. Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass. 208, 22728, 455 N.E.2d 414, 424-25 (1983) (rate base inclusion of property not used and useful is
legitimate).
92. For a discussion of the treatment of cancelled or abandoned generating plants, see
supra note 85. In the case of incomplete plants, the issue is timing: when should investors begin to earn a return on the funds they have committed to build new generating
capacity? The debt and equity capital that a utility devotes to construct new capacity is
recorded in an account known as "construction work in progress" ("CWIP"). See MidTex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1985). CWIP reflects the
cost of capital associated with financing the development and construction of the generating plant. See id. Utilities would prefer all CWIP to be placed in the rate base so that
they may begin earning a real return on their investment from the time they commit their
funds. See Regulations Preambles, II F.E.R.C. 30,455, at 30,491-92 (1983) (Order No.
298), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Some states, however, deny recovery of CWIP until the plant is used
and useful (i.e. producing electricity commercially). See, e.g., Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co.,
125 N.H. 46, 54-55, 480 A.2d 20, 25 (1984) (construing state's so-called "anti-CWIP"
statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378:30-a (1984), as not allowing recovery of CWIP in any
form). But see Mid-Tex Coop., 773 F.2d at 334 (upholding FERC's determination that
CWIP confers current benefit upon ratepayers and therefore may be consistent with used
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ciding whether to allow recovery of93 or on 94 investments in nuclear
power plants by electric utilities. 95 Utilities have enormous investments
in incomplete or abandoned nuclear generating stations. 96 The distinction between the two treatments of the investor interest can have important ramifications: the prudently-incurred investment of the Public
Service Company of New Hamshire,
for example, is four times the value
97
of its used and useful property.
III. THE INVESTOR INTEREST IN THE HOPE BALANCE
A. The Language of Hope and its Progeny
Courts that have concluded that "Hope requires... just and reasonable rates providing a return on used and useful property" 98 have misconstrued Hope and its progeny. Hope simply required just and
and useful methodology). Typically, a utility that is denied current recovery of CWIP is
allowed to capitalize its CWIP costs in an account called "allowance for funds used during construction" ("AFUDC"). AFUDC is treated as a current item for accounting purposes. That is, the utility records the capitalization of AFUDC as income. Thus, on
paper there is no significant difference between AFUDC and CWIP treatment. AFUDC
treatment, however, does not allow a current cash recovery of the utility's cost of capital
associated with financing the construction of new plant. See Mid-Tex Coop., 773 F.2d at
331; Order No. 474, 39 F.E.R.C. 61,334, published in 52 Fed. Reg. 23,948, at 23,964
(1987) (codified in 18 C.F.R. § 35.26 (1988)). When the plant is completed and becomes
operational, the utility may include AFUDC in the rate base upon which it earns a cash
return. See Mid-Tex Coop., 773 F.2d at 331. A regulatory agency may allow some hybrid of AFUDC and CWIP treatment where some of the CWIP is included in rate base
while the rest is placed in AFUDC. See, e.g., Mid-Tex Coop., 773 F.2d at 331 (FERC
allows 50% CWIP treatment with the other 50% placed in AFUDC); Order No. 474, 39
F.E.R.C. %61,334, published in 52 Fed. Reg. 23,948, at 23,964 (1987) (codified in 18
C.F.R. § 35.26 (1988)) (same).
93. Recovery of investments in cancelled plants involves amortization without rate
base treatment of the unamortized balance of sunk costs. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 16; supra note 85.
94. Recovery on the amount invested entails amortization with inclusion of the unamortized balance of expenses in the rate base. See Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra
note 9, at 16; supra note 85.
95. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 499, 505; Hoecker, supra note 2, at 321.
96. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 13.

98. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 239 Kan. 483, 490, 720 P.2d
1063, 1071 (1986), prob. jurisdiction noted, 479 U.S. 1082, appeal withdrawn, 481 U.S..

1044 (1987); see Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utils. Comm'n, 509 Pa.
324, 334, 502 A.2d 130, 135 (1985), appealdismissed sub. nom. Metropolitan Edison Co.
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); People's Org. for Wash. Energy Res. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 104 Wash. 2d 798, 843, 711 P.2d 319, 344
(1985) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). But see Kansas Gas &Electric, 239 Kan. at 518-19,
720 P.2d at 1089-90 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) (where 90% of costs denied recovery
were prudently incurred, rates thus set are confiscatory under Hope). In a majority of
cases involving abandoned plants, however, the issue has not been presented to a court
because most states and FERC allow recovery through amortization of cancelled nuclear
generating stations. See Attorney General v. Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass. 208,
224 & n.10, 455 N.E.2d 414, 422 & n.10 (1983); Note, supra note 9, at 346, 364; Note,
supra note 11, at 94.
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reasonable results; it did not qualify that requirement.9 9 Therefore, modifying Hope's end result standard adulterates the constitutional inquiry.
Moreover, the Hope Court asserted that "it is the result reached not
the method employed which is controlling,"'" thus rejecting the use of
any particular ratemaking methodology in the constitutional inquiry. 01'
Used and useful is a ratemaking methodology;10 2 by making it part of the
constitutional inquiry, courts have misconstrued Hope's mandate.' °3
While the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how to apply
the constitutional standard Hope mandates,"° the Court did offer some
guidance in determining whether rates are fair: arriving at "'just and
reasonable' rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests."' 1 5 -The Court then delineated the investor interest:
[T]he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough
revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of
the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the
stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity
of the enterprise, so as to maintain
06
its credit and to attract capital.1
The Hope Court did not articulate the investor interest in terms of property that is used and useful.' 7 Rather, it defined the investor interest
described in Hope as "an interest in return on investment."'' 08
This conclusion is buttressed by the Hope Court's analysis of the return to the Hope Natural Gas Company. 10 9 First, the Court noted that
in less than forty years, the Hope Company had earned almost seven
times its initial equity investment.' 10 The Court rejected Hope's contention that its new rates would only have yielded it a return on rate base of
99. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
100. Id. at 602.
101. See id.; Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575, 586

(1942).
102. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
103. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1179-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc).
104. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
105. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. See id.; Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1179-80

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); Drobak, supra note 4, at 121; cf Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Hope removed constitutional basis for used
and useful methodology), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951).
108. Jersey Central, 810 F.2d at 1181 (emphasis in original); see Drobak, supra note 4,
at 85, 121.
109. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603-05

(1944).

110. See id. at 603-04.
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3.27 percent. Instead, the Court accepted the FPC's contention that a
more accurate measure of Hope's "actual operations" revealed that
"Hope earned an annual average return of about 9% on the average investment.""' Thus, the12Hope Court focused its inquiry on the company's
return on investment.
The Court's most recent application of Hope supports this conclusion.1 13 In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, the Court analyzed the effects" 4 of the rate orders in two steps. First, the Court determined the
total revenue allowance11 afforded the utilities under the rate orders at
issue. 16 Next, the Court analyzed the returns on equity that these revenue allowances would imply, 117 assuming the utilities' requested amortization had been allowed as an expense.' 18 This two-step process is
similar to the one the Court employed in Natural Gas Pipeline:
The establishment of a rate for a regulated industry often involves two
steps of a different character, one of which may appropriately precede
the other. The first is the adjustment of the general revenue level to
the demands of a fair return. The second is the adjustment of a rate
schedule conforming to that level
119 so as to eliminate discriminations
and unfairness from its details.
The Duquesne Court concluded that these revenue allowances, and the
returns on equity they would imply, would not be confiscatory.120 Thus,
the Court analyzed the utilities' returns in terms of capital investment,
rather than property that was used and useful.1 '
B.

ConstitutionalIncorporation of "Used and Useful"
Deleterious to Consumers?

Courts that articulate the investor interest of Hope in terms of a return
on used and useful property needlessly skew the balancing of investor
11. See id. at 602, 605 (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 605; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1181
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane); Drobak, supra note 4, at 121.
113. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 618 (1989).
114. The Court need not have analyzed the effect of the rate order. The affected utilities had challenged the Pennsylvania statute as facially confiscatory. See id. at 618.
Neither of the utilities involved had alleged that the total effect of the rate order would be
unjust or unreasonable. See id. Nonetheless, the Court must have deemed an articulation of this analysis important enough to warrant inclusion in its opinion.
115. This is the "R" term of the utility ratemaking formula discussed supra note 68.
116. See Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618.
117. This is the "r" term of the utility ratemaking formula discussed supra note 68.
118. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 618 (1989).
119. Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575, 584 (1942).
120. See Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618.
121. See id.; Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1181 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en bane); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 18-19 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951). But see Hoecker, supra note 2, at 311-12 n.38
("When Hope, following Brandeis' concurrence in Southwestern Bell, began measuring
the investors' interest in terms of capital invested rather than property owned, it arguably
extended the philosophy of used and useful to all parts of a rate").
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and consumer interests. Typically, these courts deny utility investors a
return on property that is not used and useful on the grounds that allowing such a return would be unfair to consumers.1 22 But the Hope
analysis explicitly considers the consumer interest. 123 By considering the
consumer interest both in formulating the investor interest and in weighing the investor interest against the consumer interest, a court gives undue weight to the consumer interest. 22 This approach is neither logical
nor in accord with Hope and its progeny.' 2 5 Moreover, it is unnecessary
to weigh the consumer interest twice: the 2Hope
balancing test provides
6
adequate protection of consumer interests.'
This distortion of the Hope balance of interests in favor of the consumer is improvident as well as improper. It ignores the special relationship between the public utility and the consumer.127 In fact, consumers
may ultimately be harmed by a balancing of interests that unnecessarily
weighs in their favor. 12 By slanting the balance of interests in favor of
122. See Jersey Central, 810 F.2d at 1190 (Starr, J., concurring) (used and useful is
safeguard imposed to benefit ratepayers); Washington Gas Light, 188 F.2d at 18 & n.29.
123. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944);
Drobak, supra note 4, at 86; cf Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380,
388-89, 392-93 (1974) (discussing Hope's mandate of balancing investor and consumer
interests).
124. For example, suppose that Utility A has total invested capital of $100, 20 percent
of which has been prudently incurred but is not used and useful. A court that articulates
the investor interest in terms of return on property that is used and useful will weigh
Utility A's investment of $80 in property that is used and useful against the consumers'
interest in non-exploitive rates. In essence, the consumers' interest will have been considered twice: first, in the exclusion of investment in property that is not used and useful,
and again in the Hope balancing of interests. More properly, the investor interest should
be considered relative to the total prudently incurred investment, here $100, as well as the
other investor interests discussed in Hope. Incorporating the used and useful approach in
the constitutional inquiry could skew the balance of interests in closer cases. In any
event, it is not an approach advanced by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 99-112 and
accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
126. See Hoecker, supra note 2, at 334. The Court has made clear that "[r]egulation
may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the [investor's] return recovered
on investment, for investors' interestsprovide only one of the variables in the constitutional
calculus of reasonableness." Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); cf Drobak, supra note 4, at 97 ("substantial public
interest can justify a good deal of economic harm to the investor interest without violating the Constitution"). For a discussion of the consumer interest factor of the Hope test,
see Drobak, supra note 4, at 86-98.
127. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609, 615 (1989). The consumer
and investor interests are in many respects coterminous. See Missouri ex. rel. S.W. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 307-08 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 485 N.E.2d 610,
623-24 (Ind. 1985) (Prentice, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); Regulations Preambles, II F.E.R.C. 30,455, at 30,510 (1983) (Order No. 298), aff'd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327
(D.C. Cir. 1985). In fact, it is "[t]his partly public, partly private status of utility property [that] creates its own set of questions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 615.
128. See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 308 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Union Elec. Co.
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consumers, courts unnecessarily increase investor risk. By decreasing the
likelihood that a utility will prevail in a constitutional challenge to an
adverse ratemaking decision, courts increase the risk that an unreasonable rate may be allowed to stand. Concomitant with this increased risk
level, investors will demand higher returns on their investments.12 9 In
the long run, "[t]he cost of new capital [will] increase and service [will]
deteriorate
unavoidably because of the scarcity of reasonably priced
130
capital."
Unnecessarily veighing the balance of interests in favor of consumers
also provides incentives to utility managers that are deleterious to consumers.1 3 ' By not considering prudently-incurred expenditures for propv. F.E.R.C., 668 F.2d 389, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1981); Citizens Action Coalition,485 N.E.2d
at 623-24 (Prentice, J., dissenting); Dubin & Navarro, Regulatory Climate and the Cost of
Capital, in Regulatory Reform and Public Utilities 141, 141-42, 160-61 (M. Crew ed.
1982); Comment, supra note 85, at 696-97. One commission has observed that the question is not who should bear the costs of failed efforts to develop nuclear power plants, but
when these costs should be faced. See Attorney General v. Department of Pub. Utils.,
390 Mass. 208, 219, 455 N.E.2d 414, 420 (1983).
129. See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 307; Foster, FairReturn Criteria and Estimation, 28 Baylor L. Rev. 883, 887 (1976).
130. Attorney General, 390 Mass. at 219, 455 N.E.2d 414, 420; accord Southwestern
Bell, 262 U.S. at 308 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The community can get cheap service
from private companies, only through cheap capital."); Citizens Action Coalition, 485
N.E.2d at 623-24 (Prentice, J., dissenting); People's Org. for Wash. Energy Res. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 104 Wash. 2d 798, 818-20, 711 P.2d 319, 331-33 (1985) (en
banc); see Dubin & Navarro, supra note 128, at 141-42; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood,
An Economic Perspective of Rate Suppression Legislation, 33 U. Kan. L. Rev. 459, 465
(1985); Comment, supra note 85, at 696-97; Note, supra note 9, at 374; cf Hoecker, supra
note 2, at 333 (when utility suffers, ratepayers pay the consequences). For a discussion of
the depressive effect on utility stock prices resulting from adverse rate decisions, see
Hearth, Melicher & Gurley, supra note 9, at 18-19. See also Wells, PrudenceAudits Are
Narrowing OurEnergy Choices, 123 Pub. Util. Fort., May 11, 1989, at 16-17 (present and
future cost of funds increase because of threatened or real cost disallowances).
131. Ostensibly pro-consumer policies-denying recovery of prudently incurred costs
for incomplete or abandoned generating plants, for example-both raise the utility's cost
of capital, see supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text, and create a disincentive to
the construction of new capacity. See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d
327, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co., Inc., 485 N.E.2d 610, 623-24 (Ind. 1985) (Prentice, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1137 (1986); State ex. rel Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162,
166 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis.
2d 256, 261, 325 N.W.2d 867, 869-70 (1982); Order No. 474, 39 F.E.R.C. 61,334,
published in 52 Fed. Reg. 23,948, at 23,950 (1987) (codified in 18 C.F.R. § 35.26 (1988));
Bouknight, Balancing Risks and Rewards to Reduce FinancialDisincentives to Power
Plant Construction, 107 Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 12, 1981, at 21-23; Houston, Albrecht &
Redwood, supra note 130, at 463-65; Pierce, supra note 81, at 2052-53, 2059 & n.157;
Wells, supra note 130, at 16-17; Comment, supra note 85, at 696-97. Consumers will
eventually pay for these policies in the form of capacity shortages or higher electricity
rates. See Mid-Tex, 773 F.2d at 333-34; Citizens Action Coalition, 485 N.E.2d at 623-24
(Prentice, J., dissenting); People's Org. for Wash. Energy Res. v. Utilities & Transp.
Comm'n, 104 Wash. 2d 798, 818-20, 711 P.2d 319, 331-33 (1985); Order No. 474, 39
F.E.R.C. 61,334, published in 52 Fed. Reg. 23,948, at 23,950 (1987) (codified in 18
C.F.R. § 35.26 (1988)); Bouknight, supra, at 23; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood, supra
note 130, at 463-65; Wells, supra note 130, at 16-17; Comment, supra note 85, at 696-97.
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erty that is not used and useful, 132 courts provide disincentives1 33 to the
development of capital-intensive 134 generating plants-plants that may
hold the promise of providing cheaper service 135 and reducing the coun-

try's dependence upon imported oil.136

The development of new generating capacity entails planning and inIndustry officials are already concerned that construction of new capacity has not kept
pace with demand, in part because of "uncertainty among utilities about the financial risk
in building new plants." Wald, Growing Use of Electricity Raises Questions on Supply,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1990, at Dl, col. 1; see also Wald, Con Ed Wants to Stifle Demand,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at DI, col. 3 (Con Edison's past problems constructing new
capacity have left it wary to build).
132. For discussions of the used and useful methodology at the ratemaking level, see
Hoecker, supra note 2, passim; Comment, supra note 85. Regardless of whether the used
and useful policy is utilized by the ratemaking authority, the constitutional inquiry
should nonetheless consider all prudently incurred investment in the Hope balancing of
interests. Utilities in states that employ the used and useful methodology and in states
that do not should be accorded the same constitutional review.
133. See State ex. rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 166
(Mo. 1985) (en banc); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d
256, 261, 325 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1982); Bouknight, supra note 131, at 22-23; Dubin &
Navarro, supra note 128, at 141-42, 160-61; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood, supra note
130, at 463-66; Wells, supra note 130, at 16-17; cf Note, supra note 11, at 109 (not
allowing some recovery of prudently incurred costs will have chilling effect on utility
planning decisions).
134. The electric generating industry is particularly capital intensive. See Citizens Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 485 N.E.2d 610, 623
(Ind. 1985) (Prentice, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); Comment, supra
note 85, at 671 & n.13; Note, supra note 9, at 354.
135. See Bouknight, supra note 131, at 22; Charnoff, Why Management Did It All
Right: Overregulationand OtherActs of God, 33 U. Kan. L. Rev. 481, 481 (1985); Dubin
& Navarro, supra note 128, at 141-42; Pierce, supra note 9, at 528-29 & n.182; Wells,
supra note 130, at 16-18.
136. See Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 239 Kan. 483, 521, 720
P.2d 1063, 1091 (1986) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting), prob.juris. noted, 479 U.S. 1082,
appeal withdrawn, 481 U.S. 1044 (1987); Bouknight, supra note 131, at 22; Dubin &
Navarro, supra note 128, at 141-42; Wells, supra note 130, at 16-18. Dubin and Navarro
conducted an empirical study of the effects upon ratepayers of the regulatory climate in
which a utility operates. See Dubin & Navarro, supra note 128, at 141. They concluded
that
ostensibly "proconsumer" rate-suppression associated with an unfavorable regulatory climate has the potential to harm both consumers and the nation....
[E]lectricity rates may rise directly because of higher capital costs, while ratepayers may also bear an indirectpetroleumpenalty equal to the savings forgone
by utilities which are unable (or unwilling) to undertake otherwise economic
investments in new power plants and coal conversions which displace
petroleum.
id. at 160-61 (emphasis in original). Congress' concern with the country's dependence
upon petroleum and natural gas as primary energy sources was expressed in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (1982). One of the purposes
of the Act was to encourage the development of alternatives to petroleum and natural
gas. See 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b) (1982). Indeed, currently "some utility experts are concerned [about reliance on natural gas-fired plants] because ... [of] the prospect of a
dangerous overreliance on a single fuel source." Wald, Growing Use of Electricity Raises
Questions on Supply, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1990, at DI, col. 1.
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vestment. 137 Confronted with the risk that their investments, though
prudently incurred, will nonetheless be disregarded if they result in property that is not used and useful, utilities will be less likely to commit
capital for new generating plants. 138 This does a139disservice to current
ratepayers and is inequitable to future ratepayers.
Utilities generally have a statutory obligation to serve the public." °
This duty includes providing continuous service1 41 to all customers on
equal terms1 4 2 at fair rates. 14 3 Fulfilling this continuing obligation requires investment in plant additions. 1" Indeed, the public utility "substitute[s] for the state in the performance of the public service; thus
becoming a public servant."1 45 When a public utility fulfills this obligation by investing in additional capacity, and does so prudently, it should
at least be allowed consideration of these expenditures in the Hope bal137. See Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 472
N.E.2d 938, 946-47 (Ind.Ct. App. 1984) (Miller, P.J., dissenting), aff'd, 485 N.E.2d 610
(Ind.1985), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); People's Org. for Wash. Energy
Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 104 Wash. 2d 798, 822, 711 P.2d 319, 333
(1985); Gary & Roach, The Proper Regulatory Treatment of Investment in Cancelled
Plants, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 469, 489 (1985); Note, supra note 11, at 100.
138. See Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 485
N.E.2d 610, 623-24 (Ind.1985) (Prentice, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1137
(1986); State ex rel Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Mo.
1985) (en banc); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 256,
261, 325 N.W.2d 867, 869-70 (1982); Bouknight, supra note 131, at 22-23; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood, supra note 130, at 459, 464-65; Wells, supra note 130, at 16-17; Comment, supra note 85, at 697.
139. See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Note, supra note 9, at 361 & n. 109. But see Note, supra note 9, at 360 & n.98 (departures
from used and useful standard are inequitable because current and future ratepayers are
not necessarily the same group).
Intergenerational equity is one of the principles of the used and useful ratemaking
methodology and is one of the reasons advanced for denying rate base treatment of property not yet used and useful. See Mid-Tex Elec, Coop., 773 F.2d at 334; Regulations
Preambles, II F.E.R.C. 30,455, at 30,508 (1983) (Order No. 298), aff'd in part, vacated
in part on other grounds, Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir.
1985). However, denying recognition of current expenditures for future generating capacity ignores the benefits that accrue to current ratepaytrs, such as an assurance of a
continuing supply of energy. See 773 F.2d at 334; Regulations Preambles, II F.E.R.C. at
30,506-07; Hoecker, supra note 2, at 319-20. It also ignores the concerns of future ratepayers who have an interest in avoiding rate shocks. See 773 F.2d at 333-34; II F.E.R.C.
at 30,499-500; see also Smartt, The Complexity of Things Regulatory, 115 Pub. Util. Fort.,
May 30, 1985, at 4 (rate shocks can be avoided by placing CWIP in rate base).
140. See supra note 8.
141. See C. Phillips, Jr., supra note 5, at 106.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc); State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162,
166 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis.
2d 256, 263, 325 N.W.2d 867, 870-71 (1982); Regulations Preambles, II F.E.R.C.
30,455, at 30,504 (1983) (Order No. 298), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
145. Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 291
(1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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ancing of interests.14 6
Moreover, regulated utilities, unlike competitive enterprises, are not
free to charge what the market will bear.147 In return for monopoly status, and presumably, limited down-side risk, utilities surrender the opportunity to earn tremendous profits.14 8 Thus, if a utility's investment in
new generating capacity yields extremely inexpensive energy, the utility
"would... [receive] no windfall, but simply the standard return on its
original investment." 149 It is inequitable, then, that the utility should
bear all of the loss when its prudent investment fails.150
CONCLUSION

The mandate of Hope is clear: the end result of a rate order must be
just and reasonable. In determining the reasonableness of utility rates,
courts must weigh the affected investor and consumer interests.
Several courts have misapplied the investor interest component of the
Hope balancing standard. These courts have needlessly skewed the Hope
balance of interests by incorporating the used and useful ratemaking
methodology into the constitutional inquiry. Rather, a court should consider all prudently incurred investment when formulating the investor
interest of Hope. This approach is more consistent with Hope and its
progeny and will provide a more equitable and efficient framework for
both ratepayers and utility investors.
Sean P. Madden
146. See Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 472
N.E.2d 938, 954-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (Miller, P.J., dissenting), aff'd, 485 N.E.2d 610
(Ind. 1985), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); State ex rel. Union Elec. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Wisconsin Pub. Serv.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 256, 260-61, 325 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1982);
Sommers, supra note 8, at 374; Comment, supra note 85, at 696-97.
147. See Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 345-46 (1886); Kahn, Who Should
Pay for Power-PlantDuds, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1985, at 26, cols. 3-4.
148. See Houston, Albrecht & Redwood, supra note 130, at 462-63.
149. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 810 F.2d 1168, 1181 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en bane); see Bouknight, supra note 131, at 22-23; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood,
supra note 130, at 462-63; Note, supra note 9, at 374-75; Kahn, supra note 147, at 26,
cols. 3-4.
150. See Jersey Central, 810 F.2d at 1181 n.2; N.E.P.C.O. Mun. Rate Comm. v.
F.E.R.C., 668 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982); Citizens Action Coalition, Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 485 N.E.2d 610, 623-24
(Ind. 1985) (Prentice, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1137 (1986); Bouknight,
supra note 131, at 22-23; Houston, Albrecht & Redwood, supra note 130, at 462-63;
Sommers, supra note 8, at 374; Comment, supra note 85, at 697; Note, supra note 9, at
374-75.

